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1 Introduction property taxes, and ad valorem taxes, as well as
various taxes targeting harvest income, harvest
Forest taxation has probably been one of the yields, and long term capital gains income or
most frequently studied areas of forestry research inheritance income.1 The variety of taxes and
in the past 3 decades. Much of the proliferation government interventions reflect the different
in literature can be explained by the many differ- problems facing governments and differences in
ent forest policies employed by governments such the structures of the forest sector. In virtually all
as taxes and subsidies on the growth of forests, of North and South America, there are also many
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levels of governments setting policies, from the
national centrally located governments to the
smallest municipality. All of these governments
have varying levels of control over forest taxes,
and many implement duplicative tax systems.
The largest variety of taxes is employed in
Scandinavia and central Europe. These taxes tar-
get forest growth and harvests, and there is little
reliance on the basic property tax. This contrasts
with the U.S., where forest tax revenue is prima-
rily raised through property taxes based on some
rough indicator of market value (Gregory 1986),
or taxes are applied to long term capital gains
realized when timber is harvested (Boyd 1986).
Often market value-based taxation does not co-
incide with site value (Klemperer 1977, 1982,
1983), so that these taxes do not come close to
approximating the site value tax used in Scandi-
navia. There have been numerous arguments
made to implement "modified" property taxes
which target the growth potential of forest stands,
but these are used in only a few states (Amacher
et al. 1991, Williams and Canham 1972, Klem-
perer 1976). Harvest yield and income taxes also
remain less common, with only about 10 state
governments currently offering yield tax options
for forest landowners (Clements et al. 1986). On
the other hand, Sweden employs a nonlinear har-
vest income tax (Aronsson 1993a), while many
Scandinavian countries have forest increment tax-
es, site value taxes, and taxes applied to harvests
(Ovaskainen 1992).
Another important aspect of forest taxation
problems concerns forest ownership. In both the
U.S. and Canada, large publicly owned forest
land exists and provides a large contribution to
timber supplies. Public harvesting also is subject
to state (or lower government) taxation, and in
many cases higher governments make payments
to lower governments in lieu of taxation (Boyd
and Hyde 1989). On the other hand, nonindustri-
al ownership is significant in both North and
South America and in Scandinavia. Nonindustri-
al landowners have the dual objective of owning
forests for both timber income and nontimber
benefits and are affected by taxes differently
than industrial owners.
Forest taxation has been subject to much de-
bate in South America and most of the develop-
ing country world (especially the Philippines and
other parts or south and southeast Asia) (Hyde
and Newman 1991, Hyde and Sedjo 1992, Vin-
cent 1990). At present, the most common poli-
cies employed by these countries are lump sum
subsidies or some rough form of lump sum tax
(e.g., see Hyde 1995 for the Bolivian case, Mc-
gauhey and Gregerson 1982 for other Latin Amer-
ica cases, and Amacher et al. 1996 for the Chile-
an case). The implementation of forest taxes in
these countries is a particularly acute problem,
since centrally located national governments have
much less control over the enforcement of taxa-
tion than their developed country counterparts
(Cruz and Munasinghe 1994). However, the vast
forests of these countries contribute a great deal
to the government's ability to fund activities.2
One can imagine that similar situations exist in
the former Soviet republics.3
The purpose of this paper is to discuss emerg-
ing issues in forest taxation. We will first draw
together existing North American and Scandina-
vian literature and special forestry problems into
a set of "stylized features" of forest taxation.
Existing work will be judged by how well these
stylized facts are accommodated, and we will
then use this to motivate future research. The
intent is to show how newer more general public
finance literature might be used to enhance our
understanding of forest taxation design. We will
find though that much of the work in public
finance is not yet directly applicable to forestry
problems. Thus, suggestions will be made as to
how one might modify the existing literature to
study the right set of forest taxation problems.
We will concentrate primarily on the choice of
forest taxes and their applications. In doing so,
we will argue how previous work outlining the
effects of forest taxation on landowner behavior
and market outcomes should be imbedded into
more general problems facing the government.
Unlike existing reviews of forest taxation (Boyd
1986, Klemperer 1989) which focus on the ef-
fects of specific U.S. capital gains and property
taxes, this paper focuses on more general forest
tax design problems. It also focuses on recent
questions about what system of taxes is optimal.
Finally, unlike other review or synthesis articles,
this one also serves to compare North American
and recent Scandinavian forest taxation litera-
ture.4
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2 Two Approaches for Model-
ling Forest Taxation
Given the specialty of problems, the specificity
of taxation policies, and the differences in gov-
ernment structures and land ownership, it is not
surprising that two relatively distinct bodies of
literature have developed over the last decade.
Although there are certainly some exceptions,
these can be grouped into North American and
Scandinavian studies. The North American ap-
proach has largely been based on timber supply
in the Faustmann model of forest management.
Research has primarily examined effects on ro-
tation ages and silvicultural investments from
imposition of specific property and capital in-
come taxes, including the property tax (Jackson
1980, Chang 1982), yield and harvest taxes
(Chang 1982, 1983, Jackson 1980), modified
property and productivity taxes (Amacher et al.
1991, Dennis and Sendak 1992), nonlinear har-
vest income and property taxes (Lippman and
McCall 1981, Mendelsohn 1992), and uncertain-
ty (Lippman and McCall 1981, Sun 1994). Non-
timber benefits and associated Pigouvian taxes
have been introduced into such models as a func-
tion of time, despite possible convexity prob-
lems (e.g., Englin and Klan 1990, Swallow et al.
1990).
Early tax policy work focuses on biases in
forest property tax valuations (Klemperer
1976,82) and the incidence due to this bias (Stier
and Chang 1983). When the Faustmann model is
used to study forest tax policy, researchers have
focused on comparing property or yield taxes
based on their excess burdens, with revenue as-
sumed fixed and excess burdens depending only
on rotation age but not stand investment changes
(Gamponia and Mendelsohn 1987). Stand in-
vestment is treated by Rideout and Hof (1986),
where errors are computed for excess burden
measures that do not incorporate changes in stand
investment. Other examples of forest taxation
work with stand investment choices include
Amacher et al. (1991), Chang (1983), and Jack-
son (1980). Tax incidence with property, income,
and capital gains taxes has been investigated
when traditional Faustmann land rents (e.g., Sam-
uelson 1976) and preexisting distortions are
present (Kovenock 1986, Kovenock and Roth-
schild 1983).
With the exception of Lippman and McCall
(1981) who model uncertainty in production as a
stochastic process, perfect foresight on the part
of both landowners and governments has been a
common assumption in North American models.
Another common assumption is partial equilibri-
um, with the exception of Boyd and Hyde (1989)
and Boyd and Daniels (1985) who study capital
gains and income taxation in a static two sector
model with endogenous wages and interest rates,
and Kovenock (1986) and Kovenock and Roth-
schild (1983) who allow for equilibrium markets
in land allocated between an "Austrian" (i.e.,
timber) sector and a nontimber sector. With the
exception of Kovenock's work, authors have also
evaluated taxes independently rather than as a
system. Other common assumptions are that the
economy consists of a single landowner, all fu-
ture parameters are constant, and nontimber ben-
efits are a function of time.
Three North American studies are more typi-
cal of work from Scandinavia. These are Amacher
and Brazee (1996a) and Amacher et al. (1996)
who study taxation and incentive design with
nontimber benefits, public production, and a rev-
enue constrained government, and Max and Le-
hman (1988) who study comparative statics of
various taxes when landowners value nontimber
benefits. With a few exceptions, Scandinavian
models of forest taxation are based primarily on
two and three period representations of timber
supply (Johansson and Löfgren 1985). Uncer-
tainty in second period prices (Koskela 1989a,b),
interest rates (Ollikainen 1990), and both inter-
est rates and prices has been addressed (Ollikai-
nen 1993). Landowners are assumed to value
nontimber benefits that are a function of the
stock of unharvested timber in several studies
(Max and Lehman 1988, Ovaskainen 1992,
Amacher and Brazee 1996a), and credit con-
strained landowners are accommodated in Ol-
likainen (1990), Koskela (1989b), and Kuulu-
vainen (1990). Finally, econometric studies in-
clude estimation of the effects of nonlinear har-
vest income taxes on timber supply (Aronsson
1990), as well as estimation of the impact of
progressive harvest taxes on investment in forest
quality (Aronsson 1993b). Brännlund and Kris-
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tröm (1993) investigate the incidence due to im-
posing chlorine taxes on Swedish pulp and paper
industries, while Aronsson (1993a) investigates
the incidence of progressive harvest income tax-
es on nonindustrial landowners and forest indus-
trial firms.
The North American approach to policy de-
sign is based primarily on comparing excess bur-
dens of forest taxes computed for a series of
Faustmann rotations or a single rotation. In con-
trast, Scandinavian work has focused on other
policy design problems facing governments,
namely the effects of tax structure substitution
on harvest supplies.5 Examples include work that
investigates tax switching when revenue collec-
tions must be preserved in models of i) price
uncertainty (Koskela 1989a) and interest rate un-
certainty (Ollikainen 1990), ii) nontimber income
taxation (Ollikainen 1991), iii) imperfect capital
markets (Koskela 1989b, Ollikainen 1990,1991,
1993), iv) price and interest rate uncertainty (Ol-
likainen 1993), and v) markets with preexisting
tax distortions or nontimber benefits (Ovaskain-
en 1992). In the models for i)—iv), landowners
are not assumed to choose stand investment or
value nontimber benefit production.
Common features of Scandinavian models are
partial equilibrium in wages, prices, and interest
rates, and evaluations based only on individual
taxes. Exceptions are Ovaskainen (1992) who
considers taxes as a system of preexisting polic-
es and potential new ones, and Brännlund and
Kriström (1994) and Aronsson (1990) who al-
low for output price equilibrium. Koskela and
Ollikainen (1996) study joint optimal yield and
property taxation when governments face reve-
nue constraints and landowners value nontimber
benefits. These questions among others are stud-
ied in one North American piece, Amacher and
Brazee (1996a). Stand investment and nontim-
ber benefits have been incorporated into only a
few studies (Ovaskainen 1992, Amacher and
Brazee 1996a). Finally, Scandinavian models
have also focused more on credit constraints and
uncertainty, which are virtually absent from North
American models.
3 A Comparison of Approaches
The two period approach relies on a single gen-
eration of landowner and can be thought of as a
short run representation. The Faustmann approach
can be thought of as a long run steady state
representation. The two are similar when poli-
cies are assumed constant in the two period mod-
el. This is because the first order conditions in
the two period model can be derived in the con-
text of a more general dynamic programming
model. In the dynamic programming analogue
of the model, if parameters are assumed constant
forever, then the two period equilibrium would
repeat every two periods, giving long run results
that are similar to those obtained in the Faust-
mann model. This is because the two period
objective function can be written as a Bellman
equation if second period utility is written as a
maximal utility function. Conversely, the Faust-
mann model can be interpreted as a short run
model when one rotation is considered and land
rents are exogenous.
The relatively easy incorporation of stand in-
vestment changes into excess burden measures
is one advantage of two period models. Another
is the ability to examine policy design over a
cross section of many landowners with possibly
different incomes or valuations of nontimber ben-
efits. Such an approach would be important if
the government were interested in choosing tax-
es to achieve redistributive goals.6 Nontimber
benefits also do not appear to suffer the conse-
quences of nonconvexity argued for those that
depend on time (Swallow et al. 1990), since in
the two period model they are introduced as a
function of unharvested forest stocks. Another
advantage of the two period model is that it
translates well into more dynamic overlapping
generations models or models with forest be-
quests (it is in fact a steady state representation
of these models) (e.g., Löfgren 1991, Hultkranz
1992). It would have the same usefulness in
studying taxes that affect inheritance income.7
On the other hand, the Faustmann approach is
inherently more dynamic and, assuming its con-
stancy assumptions hold, can give policy makers
an accurate assessment of tax revenue streams
over time for specific taxes or for substitutions
between taxes (e.g., Klemperer 1983). The Faust-
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mann approach can also be used to study non-
timber benefits and associated externalities that
depend in a complex manner on the specific age
of a stand. Finally, the Faustmann approach ac-
commodates land markets in a simple manner
through the opportunity cost of bare land.
The two period model has been used more
often in cases where the focus is a forest econo-
my with many nonindustrial landowners. Here,
the two period model is useful for studying the
role of the landowners' budget possibilities on
forest management decisions. Thus, policy is-
sues such as credit constraints, budget uncertain-
ty, and utility of nontimber benefits can be stud-
ied easily. The role of budget or credit con-
straints is absent from Faustmann models. In
addition, utility-based Faustmann representations
have been proposed (e.g., Johansson and Löf-
gren 1985). However, the introduction of non-
timber benefits depending only on time remains
controversial (e.g., Swallow et al. 1990).
Thus, the Faustmann model appears appropri-
ate for the study of a single industrial forest firm
with a fixed land base interested in profit maxi-
mization, or for a government that is interested
in the stream of forest tax revenues from one
representative forest owner over time. However,
in cases where land changes affect the tax base,
where budget and credit constraints are impor-
tant to tax policy design, and where the choice of
taxes is studied over a cross section of many
landowners, the two period model appears to be
the more appropriate one.
4 Stylized Features of
Forest Taxation
Anyone who reads through this vast and grow-
ing literature comes to realize that, despite the
different approaches, there are several common
"stylized features" of forest taxation that make
for similar problems and issues. Although these
features make the study of forest taxation both
exciting and difficult, they also represent chal-
lenges policy makers face when choosing and
employing forest taxes. In this section, the styl-
ized facts are outlined to determine how well the
forest taxation literature has progressed toward
incorporating them into formal models of policy
design. This will help motivate ideas for future
research.
4.1 Forest Policy Environment
The first two stylized features address the forest
policy environment, rather than the physical for-
est resource itself. These features are i) second
best policy constraints and ii) many governments.
The first feature is evident since forest policies
are almost always implemented under "second
best" conditions. That is, there are some con-
straints on government behavior that prevent im-
plementation of a first best taxation system.8
Governments intervening in the forest sector face
three types of constraints, and policy outcomes
are second best whenever any of the three con-
straints occur. First, governments are revenue
constrained, either facing formal targets that must
be met through application of taxes or having
limited moneys to spend on forest sector activi-
ties. Second, governments are usually constrained
in terms of the types of policies that can be
employed; for example, not all forestry activities
are taxed in practice. There are few policies tar-
geting stand investments, and virtually none di-
rectly targeting nontimber benefits production
from forest land. From earlier discussions, this
implies that any tax system is potentially distor-
tional to forest management decisions. The third
constraint on government policies arises because
governments do not implement or change poli-
cies in isolation. Rather there are preexisting
distortions that make the reform in existing poli-
cies or the choice between new ones difficult. In
this case, it is well known that introducing new
taxes along with their additional distortions may
result in a less efficient tax structure than the one
currently in place. In fact neutrality of a specific
tax may no longer be desirable.
The second feature of the forest policy envi-
ronment is the many governments involved in
policy design. Often, different levels of govern-
ments control different forest taxes. However,
these governments have their own budget tar-
gets, and they are concerned primarily about
their own constituencies.9 This implies that co-
ordination of forest taxes can not be ensured in
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practice. Instead, governments compete for rev-
enue collections and may behave strategically.
Strategic behavior will likely result in inefficient
levels of public goods provided from forests and
excess burdens that are higher than when all
governments coordinate perfectly.
Second best features of forest policy are only
beginning to find their way into the forest taxa-
tion literature. However, the problems associat-
ed with many governments remain unstudied in
forestry. In addition, most previous work does
not seek to recommend the best normative tax
system for meeting a government's revenue con-
straint.
The concept of an excess burden for a forest
tax is a recent development. Excess burden in its
simplest form is defined as the loss in landowner
income in excess of government revenue collec-
tions.10 Its magnitude depends on how landown-
ers' harvest and stand investment decisions re-
spond to tax changes (Gamponia and Mendel-
sohn 1987, Rideout and Hof 1986). Gamponia
and Mendelsohn (1987) were the first to correct-
ly introduce the concepts of excess burden and
efficiency for forest taxation using a Faustmann
model. They find that yield taxes are more effi-
cient than property taxes, since the yield tax
excess burden is slightly less than that of the
property tax. However their model does not in-
clude stand investment, which Rideout and Hof
show can lead to overestimation of the "site bur-
den" when stand investment decisions are elas-
tic.
Many early studies of forest taxation have eval-
uated forest tax efficiency based only on neutral-
ity with respect to landowner decisions (Klem-
perer 1976, 1982, Stier and Chang 1983, Wil-
liams and Canham 1972). Stier and Chang find
that an unmodified property tax is biased against
capital intensive land uses, and tax-induced land
shifting makes it difficult to determine where the
incidence of such a tax will fall. Thus they argue
that forest property taxes should be neutral with
respect to land use decisions. However, taxes are
introduced into a forest economy that is assumed
to be free of distortions. Kovenock and Roth-
schild (1983) and Kovenock (1986) examine ef-
ficiency of forest taxes when there is land mar-
ket equilibrium between forest and nonforest sec-
tors. They also allow for preexisting distortions
in one or more sectors. Contrary to earlier forest
property tax work, they show that if capital in-
come taxes are present in the nonforest sector,
than the addition of a lump sum neutral tax in the
forest sector may be nonoptimal; rather, the best
system of taxes is that which jointly reduces all
distortions in both sectors. The efficient tax sys-
tem for the forest sector in this case becomes an
accrual capital income tax (based on the annual
growth in value of the forest) or an advalorem
property tax. Ovaskainen (1992) examines a sim-
ilar problem in a three period forest economy
where landowners are assumed to value nontim-
ber benefits and choose stand investment effort.
Nontimber benefits are similar to land rents in
that they induce landowners to shift between
timber and nontimber production whenever a
policy changes. Surprisingly, Ovaskainen shows
that the results of Kovenock and Rothschild still
hold under these new assumptions.
Several authors discuss the effects of changes
in tax structure that preserve revenue collections.
Generally, this "tax switching" has been investi-
gated in two period models, where changes are
proposed between yield and lump sum taxes in
either the present or future period. A common
assumption of these studies is that the economy
resides on the upward sloping part of the Laffer
curve; that is, a point where the marginal reve-
nues are increasing in taxes. The following poli-
cy conclusions are reached: In perfect capital
markets and second period price uncertainty, a
switch made in the timing of lump sum taxation
has no affect on timber supply. But changes in
the timing of yield taxes will affect timber sup-
ply, albeit in an ambiguous way (Koskela 1989a).
When landowners are rationed in credit markets,
lump sum tax switches invoke changes in cur-
rent (first period) timber supply responses since
wealth effects are present. In a model with inter-
est rate uncertainty, Ollikainen (1990) finds that
tax switches toward yield taxes from lump sum
taxes in the same period reduce harvesting in
that period, and risk averse landowners that rep-
resent net borrowers and those that are net lend-
ers respond equivalently in this respect.11 These
results also hold for credit constrained landown-
ers. Under both interest rate and second period
timber price uncertainty, many results concern-
ing yield tax substitution become ambiguous.
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However, first period tax switches produce iden-
tical results in all models. Tax switching involv-
ing the second period yield tax is ambiguous in
all models (Ollikainen 1993). Finally, assuming
second period price uncertainty and perfect capi-
tal markets, an increase in labor income taxes
with compensating decreases in lump sum taxes
will have no affect on timber supply, but in-
creases in a capital income tax (i.e., decreases in
interest deductions) compensated by decreases
in lump sum taxes produce a decreasing effect
on timber supplies (Ollikainen 1991).12
Tax substitutions that occur in the long run
may affect timber supply differently if landown-
ers can anticipate the switch. For example,
Ovaskainen (1992) shows that announced future
switches from lump sum taxation will not change
timber supplies in the transition period, but an-
nounced switches toward a yield tax may cause
large timber supply fluctuations in the transition
period even though the yield tax may be neutral
in the long run. Although all of this tax substitu-
tion work is useful for understanding how tim-
ber supply responds to changes in the tax struc-
ture, it provides policy makers with less guid-
ance about the normatively best structure of tax-
es to meet specific revenue constraints. Howev-
er, this work does reveal important tax incidence
considerations due to the shifting of harvest sup-
plies over periods, a point also addressed some-
what in Faustmann-based modelling.
Models that incorporate varying government
revenue constraints are only very recent in the
forestry literature. In the past, results were ob-
tained at only one point on the Laffer curve, so
that revenue constraints, when present, were fixed
(e.g., Koskela 1989a). Newer work where taxes
are chosen subject to minimum revenue con-
straints demonstrates scope for a system of distor-
tional and nondistortional policy instruments.
Koskela and Ollikainen (1996) and Amacher and
Brazee (1996a) find that both lump sum taxes and
yield taxes are optimal when externalities exist
through nontimber benefits, and when govern-
ments must raise a fixed amount of revenue. This
result is rather robust, given the differences in the
models.13 Amacher and Brazee also find this
when rents to forest land are binding, and either i)
nontimber benefits are absent or ii) the govern-
ment and landowner have equal valuations of
nontimber benefits. In all cases, the lump sum tax
should be used to raise a certain amount of reve-
nue while the yield tax should be used to correct
for externalities due to nontimber benefits lost
through harvesting. In addition the yield tax is
appealing with binding land rents, since landown-
ers can avoid the tax by reductions in harvests;
this retains forest land in the tax base. Finally,
when the government's revenue constraint be-
comes increasingly binding, the yield tax is opti-
mally zero. This is because the government cares
relatively less about nontimber benefits and may
not seek to correct externalities at all.
Other stylized features of forest taxation are
related to characteristics of the forest resource.
They are i) joint production of private and public
goods, ii) the dynamic nature of the forest re-
source, iii) public and private ownership of for-
ests, iv) competition of the forest sector for fac-
tors of production with other sectors of an econ-
omy, and v) the global forest economy.
4.2 Joint Production of Public and Private
Goods
The possibility that landowners derive utility from
nontimber benefits represents an important di-
chotomy among forest taxation models, from the
standpoint of both the government and the land-
owner. In the Faustmann model, nontimber ben-
efits are modelled as a function of time. Englin
and Klan (1990) derive Pigouvian taxes in such
a model when the government and landowner
have asymmetric valuations of nontimber bene-
fits. They find that the optimal type of Pigouvian
tax depends on whether nontimber benefits are
derived from young or old trees, and whether
forests grow fast or slowly. When nontimber
benefits accrue to older trees, the best policies
are those that lengthen the rotation. These in-
clude yield and severance taxes, and the un-
modified property tax based on accrual of forest
value if trees are fast-growing.
However, Englin and Klan's analysis does not
serve to recommend the normatively best system
of taxes when externalities are present. Work in
two period models has been slightly more re-
vealing in this respect (Max and Lehman 1988,
Ovaskainen 1992). Studies employing the Faust-
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mann model introduce nontimber benefits into
the profit function, while those employing the
two period model include nontimber benefits as
a utility measure for the landowner. Thus, non-
timber benefits represent rents to the stock of
unharvested timber, much like land rents in the
Faustmann model. The presence of rents to the
stock implies that harvesting and management
decisions depend on property and lump sum tax-
ation like the site value tax. Changes in these
taxes induce landowners to substitute between
timber and nontimber production, thus affecting
harvest supplies. All types of forest taxes be-
come distortional. Max and Lehman confirm this,
showing that the effects of various taxes are
ambiguous, although they do not decompose for-
est decisions into wealth and substitution effects.
Ovaskainen (1992) formally derives a landown-
er's wealth and substitution effects due to shifts
between nontimber and timber production, and
he also argues the importance of defining excess
burdens to accommodate resulting changes in all
management activities with tax changes.
Policy design in economies with nontimber
benefits becomes difficult, because the govern-
ment usually can not tax nontimber production.
The absence of taxes on nontimber production
implies that any tax system is necessarily second
best. That is, since all goods are not potentially
taxable, a proportional system of taxes and sub-
sidies (i.e., a first best system of policies) can not
be employed to raise revenue without distortions
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980).14 Some progress
has been made in understanding how changes in
the tax structure affect timber supply from land-
owners who value nontimber benefits (Ovaskai-
nen 1992). Changes in lump sum taxes induce
Income effects (since these taxes do not separate
from first order conditions).15 However, when
the landowner and government have symmetric
valuations of nontimber benefits, lump sum
taxes remain efficient. When landowners under-
value nontimber benefits relative to the govern-
ment, the property tax rate should be reduced.
4.3 The Dynamic Nature of Forest Capital
The dynamic nature of forest capital distinguish-
es forestry markets from many other capital mar-
kets. Not only does forest production contribute
to governments' uncertainty about the future for-
est tax bases and landowners' uncertainty about
future prices, but among scholars of forest taxa-
tion many debates in the last 30 years have fo-
cused on finding the best tax that does not penal-
ize owners for the long term nature of forest
production (e.g., Klemperer 1976, 1982, 1983,
and Williams and Canham 1972 are early exam-
ples). The consensus from this body of literature
is that yield and harvest income taxes, payable at
harvests rather than early in a rotation, or some
type of "fair" property tax that accounts for dif-
ferences in forest quality and production capa-
bility, are the most efficient taxes.
Dynamic forest production also means that
forest owner responses to policies may be unlike
capital owners in nonforest sectors. Forest land-
owners may have time to react to announced or
expected changes in taxation, but this response
will not always be immediate. This response is
probably also not equivalent to the case where
the landowner is surprised by a change in specif-
ic taxes, as all models of forest taxation current-
ly assume. This is because short run changes in
harvesting and stand investment may be very
different than the long run response. It is also
possible that the intertemporal transition between
policies is as important to taxation design as the
choice of taxes.16
Finally, all existing forestry models currently
assume that governments commit to using a spe-
cific policy system. The optimal adjustment of
the tax system over time also remains unstud-
ied.17 Researchers have also not yet studied how
anticipations of landowners to changes in taxes
affect forest markets and government revenue
collections.
One area that has been addressed considerably
is the effect of forest taxation under uncertainty.
A Faustmann version of this work includes Sun
(1994) who studies the effects of lump sum and
distortional cost sharing incentives on stand in-
vestment. His model and results are quite similar
to two period models that study harvest taxes
and lump sum taxes. He measures the effects of
future price uncertainty on harvests and stand
investment, assuming Samuelson-type exogenous
land rents are present. A risk compensation sub-
sidy is considered which includes either distor-
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tional (i.e., cost sharing) or lump sum payments.
The results are inconclusive, since the relative
strengths of the substitution and income effects
are ambiguous, as Koskela (1989a,b) found in
the two period model. Another example of un-
certainty in the Faustmann model is Lippman
and McCall (1981). They show, in a model with-
out stand investment, that progressive income
taxes generally decrease harvest supplies. How-
ever, a proportional tax based on increases in
forest yields over time can be neutral with re-
spect to harvest decisions. When uncertainty is
introduced, the inefficiency of progressive taxes
is reduced.
Uncertainty work in two period models con-
cludes that all forest taxes may be nonneutral
due to wealth effects that depend on the land-
owner's preferences for risk aversion. Moreo-
ver, a landowner's harvest decisions depend on
their consumption decisions (i.e., the models are
not separable). Decreases in income induced by
lump sum increases in taxes can result in the
landowner maximizing utility at a different point
of their utility function surface. Less willing to
accept risk, the landowner may harvest more and
increase current timber supplies. Yield taxes re-
main ambiguous in their effects due to substitu-
tion effects (Koskela 1989a). When credit con-
straints are imposed on forest landowners, there
are additional liquidity effects. However, these
liquidity effects are not important to qualitative
conclusions. Uncertain interest rates encourage
increased harvesting by borrowers (Ollikainen
1990). The behavior of risk averse net lenders of
capital is the reverse, and thus there is a dichoto-
my of the effects of forest taxes and interest rate
uncertainty with the basic price uncertainty case.
These differences are magnified if some of the
landowners are credit rationed. Assuming both
future interest rates and prices are uncertain, Ol-
likainen (1993) uses a mean-variance approach
to show, even under constant absolute risk aver-
sion, that wealth affects of lump sum taxes are
nonzero.
4.4 Public and Private Ownership
The diversity of forest ownership creates prob-
lems for taxation design. The literature has es-
tablished that landowners differ in their ability
to obtain credit. Here the theory of rationing
predicts that landowners will face their own sub-
jective interest rate that is a function of their
preferences (Kuuluvainen 1990).
Income differences also occur over landown-
ers due to differences in forest quality and land-
owner characteristics. Forest quality differences
can potentially mean that increasing taxes should
be applied to land of increasing quality, as ar-
gued by Klemperer (1983) and Williams and
Canham (1972). However, Amacher and Brazee
(1996b) study a model where land varies in qual-
ity and the government in budget constrained.
They find that regressive rather than progressive
taxes are efficient if landowners of the highest
quality land also have the relatively lower in-
comes. In this case the government may seek to
subsidize high quality forest land to increase
revenue collections. In practice, nonlinear taxes
are increasing in forest quality, since increasing
forest quality is revealed through increases in
the harvests of landowners.18
The multiplicity of landowners offers the gov-
ernment an opportunity to redistribute wealth
among the forest sector through its choice of
forest taxes. Although the design of taxation un-
der redistribution has not been studied in forest
taxation,19 it has been argued as an objective of
public forest management in the U.S. (Daniels et
al. 1991). The implications for many different
landowners facing similar taxation systems has
also not been investigated, yet could be impor-
tant in the choice of tax policies.
4.5 Competition for Factors Between
Forest and Nonforest Sectors
Forestry production competes with agriculture
and other industries for inputs, namely land, la-
bor and investment resources. As the govern-
ment changes the tax structure, one can expect in
small economies that labor markets adjust and
marginal land shifts between forestry and the
next best use. This is because labor is a nontrad-
ed factor of production. However, in large open
economies, there are greater effects. Changes in
forest taxes will spillover into labor and capital
markets, causing adjustment in equilibrium fac-
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tor demands and prices. In both small and large
economies these effects are important in defin-
ing the welfare cost of taxation.20
There have been relatively few forest taxation
studies which include non-forest sectors. Non-
forest sectors have been studied by i) including
land rental income constraints in either Faust-
mann or two period models (e.g., Kovenock 1986,
Kovenock and Rothschild 1983), and ii) allow-
ing factor or output prices to be determined in
equilibrium (Aronsson 1990, Boyd and Hyde
1989, Boyd and Daniels 1985, Brännlund and
Kriström 1993).
The first two papers have previously been ad-
dressed (see the Forest Policy Environment sec-
tion). Brännlund and Kriström (1993) allow for
output market equilibrium, while Boyd and Dan-
iels' (1985) work is based on a static computable
general equilibrium model that allows for both
factor and output price equilibrium. Brännlund
and Kriström examine the welfare effects of in-
troducing a chlorine tax in the Swedish pulp
industry. They derive the incidence of chlorine
taxes under the assumption of output price equi-
librium, but their econometric example shows
that the incidence of the chlorine tax is well
approximated by partial equilibrium measures
since the effect of the tax on prices is small. This
is perhaps due to price taking behavior in world
markets. Consider Boyd and Daniels (1985) and
Boyd and Hyde (1989), who find price effects
from changes in the U.S. forest capital gains
income tax to be significant.
Thus far, the main weakness of computable
general equilibrium approaches is the static na-
ture of the models. This reduces the policy rele-
vance of these studies to forestry problems. A
more complete analysis would require solving
the model at each point in time. Moreover, the
multiplier information needed to solve these mod-
els at the necessary levels of aggregation re-
mains scarce for the forest sector in most coun-
tries.
4.6 Global Economy Constraints
There are several political constraints imposed on
any government's choice and application of do-
mestic forest taxes. Pigouvian policies may be-
come more important for countries who must
implement them to adhere to provisions in the
GATT agreement (Trade and environment...
1994). Assuming countries are willing to control
their own forest production before imposing tar-
iffs on another country's products, the incidence
of the imposed tariff to the rest of the economy is
multidimensional. The welfare effects of changes
in forest import tariffs will also depend on the
welfare costs of imposing taxes on domestic for-
est production. Thus the reform in any tariff sys-
tem is related to reform in domestic tax structures.
Forest taxation work does not yet provide enough
answers about how this reform should proceed, let
alone the best set of policies to impose.
5 Frontiers of Forest Taxation
Our discussion of the stylized features of forest
taxation reveals many issues that remain unad-
dressed. Future work should:
5.1 Continue to Develop an Understanding
of Tax Policies Under Financial Con-
straints
Although the most recent forestry work incorpo-
rates government revenue constraints into policy
design, much additional work is needed. At
present, existing forestry studies seek to find the
best system of taxes to meet a given fixed reve-
nue constraint. General equilibrium is included
by assuming either elastic labor supply or output
market equilibrium. However, potentially inter-
esting questions can be obtained from the dual of
this approach. In the dual, the government faces
a materials balance constraint,21 where output is
equal to demand for goods, or in the forestry
case, the demand for factors equals the total
supplies (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). Equilibri-
um is included by restricting factors to be em-
ployed so that their prices are equal to their
marginal products.22 The revenue constraint is
then removed using Walras law and the govern-
ment chooses quantities, allowing revenue to
vary. With this dual approach, the following ques-
tion can be addressed: How much revenue, rela-
tive to other sectors, should the forestry sector
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provide the government? A related issue con-
cerns the optimal size of the forest tax base. In
the early forest property tax literature, authors
questioned whether marginal (lower quality)
forestland should be subject to the same taxation
as higher quality land, especially if taxation of
marginal land shifts its use out of forest produc-
tion. Recently, research in problems where gov-
ernments seek to raise the most revenue from
taxation of commodities suggests that goods
should be included in the tax base if they have
relatively high substitution elasticities with each
other (Wilson 1987). It becomes an empirical
question whether nonmarginal and marginal for-
est land are substitutable. One important differ-
ence between forest land and commodities stud-
ied in public finance is the presence of nontim-
ber benefits. Future work should examine the
following question: How should the substitution
of timber and nontimber benefits on forest land
and differences in forest quality be used to deter-
mine its taxability?
A government's financial position is impor-
tant to the environment as well. If a govern-
ment's valuation of nontimber benefits is domi-
nated by the bindingness of its revenue con-
straint, the chosen tax structure may not result in
the optimal level of public goods for the global
economy. Witness developing countries, where
subsidies and liberal concessions are resulting in
large scale deforestation needed for growth of
the economies (Hyde and Newman 1991). This
represents a potential "fiscal externality." Future
work should address the following question: How
is the strength of fiscal and Pigouvian externali-
ties important to forest policy design? In partic-
ular, are nontimber benefits over or under pro-
vided in an economy where fiscal externalities
dominate?
Another potential application of optimal taxa-
tion theory is a more complete study of forest
capital income taxes. The forestry literature main-
tains that the presence of a capital income tax is
important for tax substitution results. However,
the question should also be asked: If the govern-
ment needs to raise revenue from forest taxation,
should the forest capital tax be imposed if other
taxes are available ?23 A related question contin-
ues to be: What is the best normative system of
forest taxes under all of the situations discussed
in the literature, including credit constraints,
various uncertainties, and political constraints?
5.2 Identify the Inefficiencies of Fiscal
Federalism in Forest Policy Design
The problem of tax choice under many govern-
ments is a recent issue in public finance. When
governments fail to coordinate their policies, ei-
ther because they face different revenue con-
straints or care about different constituents, this
is known as the fiscal federalism problem (e.g.,
Oates 1994 provides a recent survey). Existing
fiscal federalism models focus on governments
at the same level of power who are trying to tax
and raise funds to provide public goods to their
own residents (Futagami 1989, Wildasin 1988,
Gordon 1983), and noncooperative behavior is
modelled using Nash equilibria. These models
find that governments under provide public goods
to nonresidents.
Fiscal federalism is an extremely important
potential problem in forest taxation. It is already
a problem in the U.S. or Canada, where lower
governments rely on tax revenue from higher
government public forest harvests. However, fis-
cal federalism might become more important in
Europe, as governments pledge greater coopera-
tion in policy design.
So far, forestry models abstract from several
governments, or they assume that all govern-
ments coordinate perfectly. However, what is
more believable is that governments play strate-
gic policy games, choosing their own policies
accounting for the reactions of other govern-
ments. Strategic behavior between governments
will lead to inefficient levels of forest taxes, and
thus inefficient levels of harvesting and nontim-
ber benefit production. Research should be di-
rected at the following set of questions: What
are the consequences of fiscal federalism to for-
est policy under a variety of strategic behavior
assumptions (simultaneous move games, leader-
follower games) ? How important are fiscal and
Pigouvian externalities to miss-coordinated pol-
icy design ?
The existing economics literature is not direct-
ly applicable to the forestry problem. This is
because these models focus on governments at
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the same level who are competing for capital and
labor. They also do not incorporate aspects of
dynamic forest capital accumulation, and gov-
ernments are not assumed to own revenue-gen-
erating capital. More research is needed to deter-
mine: What are the consequences in the short
run and long run of fiscal federalism when the
economy contains appreciating forest capital,
and when the government can own part of the
capital stock? What measures are necessary to
correct such inefficiencies? Since forest produc-
tion is dynamic, strategic behavior by a govern-
ment will not be limited by the choices of forest
taxes in just one time period.
5.3 Investigate Dynamic Forest Taxation
Design
Forest taxes are similar to productive capital tax-
ation in the public finance literature (e.g., Judd
1991, 1985, 1987). However, these studies are
not directly applicable as they are based on the
assumptions that i) capital depreciates, and ii)
capital does not produce public goods. The types
of agents in the economy also abstract from for-
est landowners. Thus there is much scope for
studying forest taxation in a capital-theoretic
model. Perhaps the easiest way to move from the
large collection of two period literature to more
dynamic issues is to cast social welfare as an
overlapping generations utility function. Such a
model would assume that each acre of land was
owned by a two period lived forest landowner,
who bequeathed or sold the land to the next two
period lived forest owner at the end of his/her
life. At any point in time, the forest economy
would consist of overlapping generations of land-
owners.
Several policy questions could be studied in
this more dynamic generalization, for example:
How do the effects of forest taxation to timber
supplies differ in the short run and long run?
More importantly, How do government prefer-
ences for nontimber benefits and revenue gener-
ation affect the optimal set of taxes in both the
short run and long run?, and What are the impli-
cations for transitions in tax structures over time ?
Since the two period model approximates a steady
state in the overlapping generations model, the
more interesting results may be transitional ef-
fects and long run welfare costs of policies.
In many developed economies long run timber
supply is critically dependent on timber bequests
of nonindustrial landowners to future genera-
tions. Thus, important issues to ask in dynamic
tax problems include: How do taxes affect long
run bequests and the accumulation ofunharvest-
edforest capital in the economy.
There are many examples in the public finance
literature that employ overlapping generations
(OLG) models to study consumption advalorem
taxes, lump sum taxes, and interest income taxes
when productive capital is present in the econo-
my (Ordover and Phelps 1979, Park 1992). There
are also several papers that study the OLG mod-
el with uncertainty in either government policies
(Laitner 1990), in wages (Hamilton 1987), or in
production (Sargent 1987). However, these mod-
els are not suitable for forestry applications. They
assume that consumers are holders of capital,
and uncertainty is usually introduced into con-
sumer wage income. They also assume that
growth in the economy occurs through labor
growth and that capital depreciates. In the forest
sector, income uncertainty due to production is
probably more relevant than wage uncertainty,
since labor costs are incurred only periodically.
Further, growth in the forest sector over time
should be described by land and forest capital
changes.24
The anticipations of forest landowners to poli-
cies and the effects on timber supply also remain
to be studied. Although two period models can
accommodate uncertainty in second period pric-
es (which is perhaps equivalent to uncertainty
landowners may have about future yield tax pol-
icies), these models can not be used to measure
the effects on timber supply of policy announce-
ments in the first period, versus a surprise policy
in the second period. To do so would require that
the government is assumed not to commit to a
forest policy. Commitment is a common assump-
tion in forest tax models.
The reactions of landowners are important to
government revenue, externalities, and forest in-
vestments. The short-run response of a landown-
er will depend on whether they are surprised by
a policy change, and how elastic are their expen-
ditures on stand investments due to tax changes.
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However, the long run response will depend on
changes in forest capital accumulation occurring
over the entire time path of the economy, and
this will be affected by short run responses. Thus,
it would be useful to answer the questions: How
does timber supply respond when landowners
anticipate changes in the tax structure? Is this
different than the response when landowners are
surprised by government policy? The govern-
ment's application of policies to raise revenue
and to control for externalities could be quite
different under these situations. Essentially the
government has an additional policy instrument
at its disposal; therefore, the question remains:
Can the government gain by exploiting land-
owner anticipations to correct externalities and
raise revenue in the short and long run ?
Anticipations of policies in models of capital
growth have been examined for interest income
taxes and simple commodity taxes (Judd 1985).
Laitner (1990) extends Judd's analysis to an over-
lapping generations model. Both of these studies
suffer in their applicability to forestry problems
for the previously mentioned reasons.
Another area missing from the forest taxation
literature is the issue of optimal timing of taxes and
the consequences of governments that do not com-
mit to future policies. The general public finance
literature has shown that the rankings of optimal
tax systems are not preserved when the govern-
ment prefers to wait until the second period to
determine tax rates for that period. Rogers (1987)
is the most relevant of these studies to forestry
problems. She assumes that consumers supply
labor to obtain income, so the model is similar to
the forestry problem if we view harvests as an
addition to income, treat forest labor in the usual
manner, and impose equilibrium in factor markets.
Finally, existing studies of forest tax switches in
two period models abstract from administrative
costs. It is well known that administrative costs are
incurred whenever new taxes are imposed (Slem-
rod 1990 reviews literature surrounding adminis-
trative costs). In addition the government incurs
adjustment costs whenever changes in an existing
tax system are made (e.g., Zodrow 1985). From an
efficiency standpoint, excess burdens are biased if
marginal administrative costs are not included.
Thus, it is important to ask the question: How
important are administrative costs to the choice
and application of forest tax systems? Existing
models of tax switching abstract from administra-
tive costs. Therefore one should also ask the ques-
tion: How robust are current tax switching results
when administrative costs for lump sum taxes and
harvest taxes are not equal?
5.4 Investigate Open Economy Forest Tax
Policy
Political constraints due to trade agreements have
not been introduced into models of forest taxa-
tion. The design of forest taxes will be increas-
ingly related to international policies. Thus, it
appears useful to study the following questions:
What are the welfare costs of restrictions in
forest tax structures due to international agree-
ments ? How should forest taxes be designed sub-
ject to these political constraints?
Further, in many global economies the forest
sector may be one of many revenue and employ-
ment generating sectors. Many goods are traded
and some are not. Goods that are traded in a
small economy face world prices, so changes in
taxes affect only a readjustment in exchange rates
and profits of exporting firms (Gordon and Lev-
insohn 1990). Conversely, tax changes imposed
on nontraded goods, for example labor, cause
readjustment in domestic equilibrium factor pric-
es. Hence the efficient design of forest taxation
should depend on what products are traded: What
are the most efficient forest taxes in an economy
with traded and nontraded forest products and
factors? How does the welfare cost of taxation
depend on the tradeability of forest goods? For a
discussion of optimal taxation in economies with
traded and nontraded goods, or economies with
political trade constraints, see Razin and Slem-
rod (1990). Unfortunately, these models are not
directly applicable to forestry problems. This is
because only consumption policies are studied,
and firms are assumed only to exist to the extent
that they set marginal products of factors equal
to the factor prices. In addition, firms' profits are
also assumed 100% taxable. In forest markets,
profits can not be taxed away entirely, because
unobserved rents to land or rents to the forest
stock from nontimber benefits production can
become binding as landowner income decreases.
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5.5 Investigate Multiple Ownership of
Forest Capital and Distributive Issues
of Taxation
Different types of forest owners have not been
simultaneously treated in models of forest taxa-
tion. In practice, taxes redistribute wealth among
nonindustrial landowners, industrial landowners,
and forest laborers. The effects of redistribution
depend on equilibrium adjustments in labor and
capital markets. Since most government's have
redistributive goals in mind when taxes are cho-
sen, one should consider the following question:
How do systems of forest taxes redistribute wealth
among landowners? Also, if redistribution is pos-
sible, can it be used to increase social welfare
from a given forest tax system? In the second
best case, redistribution of wealth is a significant
policy option, since it is possible to achieve a
higher level of social welfare from changes in
existing tax structures.
5.6 Design Econometric Studies to Test
Assumptions of Forest Policy Design
and Reform
At present, there is little known about the rea-
sonableness of assumptions imposed in forest
taxation research. For example, partial equilibri-
um is a common feature of models. Also, many
studies focus only on taxation of harvests but not
on taxation of interest income. In practice, the
quantitative effects of these two policies on land-
owner behavior and government revenue collec-
tions may not be equal. Yet there is little empiri-
cal knowledge about the quantitative effects of
forest taxes. One difficulty with empirical stud-
ies is that forest tax systems have been changed
relatively infrequently in practice. As a result, it
is difficult to estimate relationships between mar-
ginal tax revenues and different forest policies.
The lack of empirical forest sector data over
time also makes it difficult to estimate welfare
costs associated with forest taxes. The welfare
cost is defined as the change in income of the
forest landowner divided by the changes in gov-
ernment revenue (Auerbach 1985). It depends
on landowner income and harvest elasticities with
respect to each tax. Once welfare costs are com-
puted for a variety of taxes, reform of the tax
system will improve social welfare if small ad-
justments are made toward taxes with lower wel-
fare costs. Although welfare costs have been
estimated for several agricultural taxes (e.g., see
the empirical studies in Newberry and Stern
(1987)), they have yet to be determined for for-
est taxes. The task is not an easy one since chang-
es in government revenue from changes in forest
harvesting can take many years to be realized.
One potential future use of computable gener-
al equilibrium models could be to gain an under-
standing of the quantitative effects of forest tax-
es to landowner behavior and government reve-
nue through simulations. Simulations can be con-
structed for a range of forest production and
ownership assumptions. The simulations can also
be used to test the sensitivity of equilibrium
factor and output market prices to changes in
forest taxes. Further simulations are also needed
to incorporate nontimber benefits into landown-
er objectives, to study the effects of shifting tax
bases on equilibrium forest markets, and to in-
corporate various levels of forest production (both
raw material and finished goods) into the second
best policy problem. At present the highly ag-
gregative nature of computable general equilib-
rium models make them less applicable to a range
of landowner types.
Finally, most alternatives to property taxation
throughout the U.S are optional. Relatively little
in known about why landowners do not adopt
certain tax options, particularly when the theory
supports that they should. Dennis and Sendak
(1992) is a recent example of an empirical study
aimed at determining participation in Vermont's
use tax program. They find that landowner char-
acteristics and infrastructure are important ex-
planatory variables. Before tax systems can be
designed with confidence, the understanding of
how landowners respond to new taxes and chang-
es in existing taxes needs continual refinement.
6 Concluding Remarks
The new forest taxation problems are exciting
and will probably lead to as voluminous a litera-
ture as already exists. Proposing these new di-
rections would be incomplete without a state-
ment of the appropriate future models. As forest
taxation work progresses from the landowner
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problem to the one facing a government that
must choose between policies, the two period
and related dynamic models will likely emerge
as the more useful ones. They suffer less from
the problems of multiple landowners and multi-
ple acres inherent in the Faustmann approach.
The specification of nontimber benefits, which
should always remain a critical piece of good
future forest tax work, also suffers less from
convexity problems in the two period model.
The Faustmann approach has less relevance em-
pirically, since tax-induced shifts of only a few
years are common results, and these shifts are
probably of little consequence to landowners who
are motivated by short run demands (such as
mill constraints) or cash requirements (for non-
industrial landowners). However, the two period
approach should translate quite nicely to cross
sectional studies of tax induced changes in the
forest land base.
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Notes to the Text
1. See Klemperer (1989) and Boyd (1986) for a dis-
cussion of US tax policies, Ovaskainen (1992) for
a discussion of Finnish tax policies, Aronsson
(1993a,b) for a discussion of Swedish taxes, For-
estry policies... (1988) for European forest taxes
and policies, and Hyde and Newman (1992) for a
discussion of taxes in many developing countries.
2. Hyde and Kuuluvainen (1995) report that, in Lao
PDR, revenues from forest harvesting fees and
taxes support over 2/3 of the forest ministry's 45
million dollar budget.
3. In the future, developed and developing country
taxation issues will become very closely related.
Already, international trade policies are begin-
ning to affect domestic tax structures. Certain
GATT provisions require that countries imposing
tariffs on imports from developing countries to
"correct" international externalities from timber
harvesting, must themselves correct domestic ex-
ternalities using an equivalent type of tax (Trade
and environment... 1994, GATT Article III). Such
a policy represents an additional political con-
straint that will very shortly be imposed on forest
taxation.
4. Several important issues are not addressed in this
paper. In particular, we will not address forestry
subsidies, although we will mention where taxa-
tion models would be applicable to subsidies giv-
en their natural relationship. Much of this litera-
ture has proliferated in the U.S. due to state-im-
plemented forestry incentives programs. We will
also only briefly address the specific taxation is-
sues of capital gains income taxation and property
taxation1 found in the U.S., although Boyd (1986)
and Klemperer (1989) provide comprehensive re-
views of this work leading up to the 1986 revision
of U.S. tax codes. Finally, we will focus on more
recent developments in forest taxation over the
last 10 or 15 years, as much this work has not yet
been adequately evaluated or compared.
5. Klemperer (1983) also examines tax switching in
a Faustmann-type single rotation model.
6. Similar goals have been investigated for public
forest management in the U.S., where changes in
public harvesting distributes income to local com-
munities (Daniels et al. 1991, Hyde and Newman
1992). The two period model may be more tracta-
ble for studying redistribution, particularly be-
cause incorporation of many landowners and mar-
ket equilibrium in the Faustmann model is very
difficult, as Brazee and Mendelsohn (1990) dem-
onstrate.
7. Hultkranz shows the overlapping generations mod-
el is useful to study bequests of nonindustrial land-
owners.
8. Starrett (1988) provides an excellent discussion of
the differences between first and second best poli-
cies.
9. For example, in the U.S., states and municipalities
control property taxes and some harvest taxes,
while the federal government also controls taxes
on income and harvest income and manages pub-
lic harvesting. The federal government pays tax
revenue (or payments in leu of taxes) to the states
for public harvests that occur on National forests
in the state. In Canada, provincial governments
control harvests, while local governments levy
harvest taxes. In much of the developing world,
federal governments allocate public harvests
through concessions, but local governments may
control some taxes and fees.
10. It can also be defined in terms of utilities (e.g.,
Tresch 1984).
11. This is true despite the finding that net borrowers
harvest more and net lenders harvest less under
interest rate uncertainty.
12. In many studies, the term "capital income" tax is
used. In Scandinavian cases, it refers to a tax on
interest income or income from investments. In
some cases, interest rate deductions are also al-
lowed for forest landowners at the same rate as the
tax. In North American literature, it refers to taxes
applied to capital gains "realized" when timber is
harvested (i.e., a realized capital income tax), or
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gains that accrue throughout the rotation as the
value of stumpage appreciates (i.e., an accrual
capital income tax).
13. Koskela and Ollikainen's model assumes second
period price uncertainty for the landowner, certain
budgets for the government, constant taxes, and
fixed stand investment. Amacher and Brazee's
model assumes perfect foresight, nonconstant tax-
es, and allows stand investment to be a choice
variable for the landowner. Both models allow for
nontimber benefit production.
14. In the common forestry situation, stand invest-
ment effort is also not taxed, so that even constant
harvest taxes affect forest management decisions.
15. Much in the same way that constant harvest taxes
do not separate from first order conditions when
stand investment is a choice for the forest land-
owner (Jackson 1980).
16. Because nearly all existing work is based on the
Faustmann model or the two period one, we do
not yet have enough information about policy de-
sign in transition periods. Ovaskainen (1992) con-
trasts short run and long run policy design using a
three period model. The second period represents
the long run steady state when all parameters are
constant. He shows that harvests are equal to
growth. Qualitative forest taxation results in the
long run and short run are similar. For example,
lump sum and profit taxes are neutral with respect
to steady state harvest supply. Like Faustmann
models (e.g., Chang 1983), permanent yield tax
increases decrease timber supplies, as do advalor-
em property tax increases.
17. However, work in other areas has shown that per-
manent emissions tax design (with commitment)
and interim tax design (with no commitment) can
be very different (Malik 1992).
18. Aronsson (1993) provides an econometric proce-
dure to estimate roundwood supplies under the
Swedish example of the harvest income tax, where
tax rates are increasing functions of harvest in-
come.
19. Aronsson (1990) considers redistribution of in-
come over forest industry and landowner when
harvest income taxes become increasingly pro-
gressive, he finds that virtually all of the incidence
of progressive harvest income taxes falls directly
on the landowners due to elasticities of landowner
management responses.
20. Spillover of forest policies to nonforest sectors is
also important to environmental policy design
(Cruz and Munasinghe 1994). Although forests
represent significant tax bases throughout the
world, their exploitation for revenue and develop-
ment creates external costs due to lost biological
diversity and other nontimber benefits. Thus, the
government should have as an objective deter-
mining how much revenue the forest sector should
optimally generate, or how much subsidization of
the forest sector should occur relative to other
sectors.
21. The materials balance constraint can incorporate
open economy issues by the introduction of ex-
port supplies to the rest of the world, as well as the
exchange rate (Razin and Slemrod 1994).
22. Unfortunately, it may abstract away from nontim-
ber benefits production, since landowners' factor
price equations become quite complicated.
23. The public finance literature would seem to sug-
gest little support for the forest capital income tax.
Judd (1985,1987) shows that, even when the gov-
ernment has redistributive goals, a tax on depreci-
ating capital is optimally zero in the long run. One
wonders whether this result would hold for forest
capital when credit constraints already impose dis-
tortions in the landowner's perceived cost of capi-
tal (e.g., Kuuluvainen 1990).
24. The recent overlapping generations models in for-
estry provide an important starting point for more
dynamic policy design. However, they are cur-
rently unsatisfactory since each individual is as-
sumed to own one tree. As the population increas-
es, the number of trees increase. This ignores im-
portant land constraints.
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